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Abstract 
Using a sample of French crop farms during the 1999-2007 period, we test whether farmers’ 
technical efficiency under conventional practices is a significant driver of conversion to 
organic farming. An important issue is whether subsidies to organic farming could encourage 
inefficient farmers to convert. We find that the probability of conversion does depend on 
technical efficiency preceding the conversion, but that the direction of the effect depends on 
farm size. This result is found to be robust to the method of calculation of efficiency scores, 
either parametric or non-parametric. This study also confirms that farm’s characteristics 
(education, farm size, indebtedness) and farmers’ practices under conventional farming do 
impact the probability of conversion to OF. 
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1. Introduction  
A number of food-safety events along with increasing concerns for sustainability of 
ecosystems make organic farming (OF) an appealing option for both governments and 
consumers. As a consequence, most governments, particularly in the United States (US) as 
well as in the European Union (EU), have encouraged farmers to convert to OF by 
distributing conversion subsidies. In the EU the first national subsidization programs started 
in a few countries like Denmark and Austria at the end of the 1980s, while the EU-wide 
recognition arrived with the Council Regulation 2092/91 and the inclusion of support to OF in 
agri-environmental measures (Stolze and Lampkin 2009). The rationale behind subsidies to 
OF is that farmers internalize negative externalities on the environment, without being paid 
for it on the market.  
 
Although there exist claims that agricultural subsidies in general have rather favored 
conventional systems to the detriment of organic systems (e.g. Nemes 2009), the provision of 
specific support to OF may be the main motivation to adopt the organic technology (OT) for 
some farmers. In her literature review Padel (2001) noted for example that the adoption of OT 
had been higher in those European countries where the support program for OF was more 
favorable. If conversion to OF has historically been based on ideological motives and other 
non-economic factors, a shift to financial motivation has been observed since the late 1990s 
when payments for OF started to be introduced (Rigby et al. 2001; Darnhofer et al. 2005; 
McCarthy et al. 2007). Farmers adopting OT based on economic aspects are identified in the 
literature as “pragmatic”, in opposition to “committed” converters. The possibility of OF 
specific subsidy programs attracting “subsidy-hunters” has been discussed by Pietola and 
Oude Lansink (2001) and Tzouvelekas et al. (2001), but seldom tested.  
 
If the objective of the policy is to support agricultural activity and farmers’ income, then 
attracting “subsidy hunters” into OF may not be a problem per se. However, if the policy is 
aimed at maximizing organic production at the least possible cost, then it may be worth 
checking who is attracted by the subsidy program. Indeed, if “subsidy-hunters” make their 
production choices based on the maximization of subsidies received, they are likely to be less 
efficient than farmers who search for the best combination of outputs and inputs based on 
prices and available technology. In this particular situation, the subsidy program could induce 
some adverse selection effect that may not be considered desirable by the policy makers.  
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The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether less efficient farmers are more likely 
to convert. This test has been made only once, as far as we know: Kumbhakar et al. (2009), on 
a sample of Finnish farms, estimate simultaneously technical efficiency (TE) and organic 
adoption. They do not find any evidence of an adverse selection effect since, on their sample, 
inefficiency did not increase the probability of conversion to OF. In this article we test the 
adverse selection hypothesis on a sample of French crop farms by assessing the impact of past 
TE on the decision to convert to OF. By contrast to Kumbhakar et al. (2009) who perform a 
joint estimation, we employ a two-stage approach. We estimate the influence of several 
determinants, including TE calculated in a first stage, on the probability to convert to OF. In 
order to draw robust conclusions, TE scores are calculated using both parametric methods 
(stochastic frontier) and non-parametric methods (bias-corrected Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), and Free Disposal Hull (FDH)). In addition we take into account that French farmers 
operate in very different agro-climatic conditions when calculating the TE scores. The data 
used cover several years, enabling us to investigate the influence of several farm 
characteristics, including TE, in past periods, on the decision to adopt OF.  
 
There exist a number of articles comparing TE of organic producers and conventional 
producers. Such comparisons are an indication of how close to the production frontier each 
group of farmers operates. But because organic and conventional production technologies are 
different in most cases (Mayen et al. 2010), such a comparison cannot be used as evidence for 
or against the adverse selection hypothesis. We argue that such evidence can only be obtained 
by estimating simultaneously production choices and decision to convert to OF (Kumbhakar 
et al. 2009) or by investigating the role of past characteristics, including TE, on the 
probability to adopt OT (this paper).  
 
Another contribution of this paper is to provide the first comprehensive analysis of factors 
driving the adoption of OF in France, a country which lies behind other European partners in 
terms of organic food production. Only 2% of the total arable land in France was under OF in 
2007, a figure lower than what is observed in most European countries, e.g. Spain (4%), 
Germany (5%), Portugal (6%), Italy (9%) and Sweden (10%) (Agence Bio 2010). In 2007 the 
French government launched a broad reflection on the state of the environment in the country 
(the Grenelle de l’Environnement) and on measures to improve the condition of the 
environment. In particular, the government has set an objective of a threefold increase of the 
national area under OF between 2007 and 2012 (i.e., an increase from 2% to 6%), and an 
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increase to 20% in 2020. Some crucial policy steps are necessary to attain this objective, since 
at the end of 2008 only 2.1% of the national utilized agricultural area (UAA) were under OF. 
Understanding the determinants of conversion to OF and in particular the effect of past 
performance (as measured by technical efficiency) will provide valuable information for 
designing successful policy programs.  
 
Section 2 explains the modeling framework. In Section 3, we describe the data and discuss 
our hypotheses regarding the role of the main variables of interest on OF adoption. In Section 
4, we present the methodology for calculating TE scores and estimating the probability of 
conversion to OF. The results are commented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Modeling framework 
For comparability purposes, we focus our analysis on crop farming and disregard livestock 
farming, for which requirements for converting to OF are more complex. We assume that a 
representative crop farmer (currently using conventional practices) takes the decision to adopt 
organic technology (OT) or to continue with the conventional technology (CT) based on the 
comparison of his/her expected profit under the two technologies during the next five years. 
In France this duration corresponds to the period during which the farmer receives subsidies 
for conversion after the conversion occurred (Ministère de l’Agriculture 2001). Since the 
conversion to OF is not an irreversible decision, the farmer may decide, at the end of the five-
year period, to switch back to conventional farming. For the period under consideration, there 
was no support scheme for organic farmers in France after the conversion period had ended. 
 
For simplicity, we assume that the farmer owns one unit of land, and that all this land is 
converted to OF in case of adoption of this technology. In addition, we assume that converting 
to OT does not alter the crop pattern on the farm. We also assume that the farmer is risk-
neutral and we neglect the discount factor. A farmer will adopt OT in year t if and only if  
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with OT OT OT OT OT OTt t t t t tp y w x sΠ = − +  and CT CT CT CT CT CTt t t t t tp y w x sΠ = − + , the t-th period 
profit under the OT and CT, respectively. Variables p, y, w, x, and s denote respectively 
output prices, output levels (and in our case, yields), input prices, input quantities, and 
subsidies received by the farms. The underlying technology is assumed to be different for 
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organic and conventional farming: ( )OT OT OT OT;t ty f x θ= t t and  where ( )CT CT CT CT;t ty f x θ=
OT
tθ  and CTtθ  represent farmer’s TE under OT and CT, respectively. Although most of the 
machinery can be used in both technologies, the ban of applying synthetic fertilizers and plant 
protection in OF suggests that both technologies and production practices are different.  
 
In general, we expect the price of organic products to be higher than the price of conventional 
products once the production has been organically certified. The price differential may 
compensate (at least partly) for the loss in productivity since yield under OT is expected to be 
lower than yield under CT . As the farmer cannot sell products under certified 
organic labeling before the end of the transition period, that is to say before three years of 
conversion have passed
( OTty )CTty<
OT CT  in 1 and t t
1, the following relationships apply: 2p p t t= +
OT CT
t tw w=
+  and 
. The price differential in favor of organic products has for 
example been given evidence by McBride and Greene (2009). The authors have shown that, 
for US soybean producers, the commodity price per bushel was on average more than USD 9 
higher for organic than for conventional soybean in 2006. By contrast, average organic 
soybean yields were 16 bushels per acre lower than yields of conventional soybean. Oelofse et 
al. (2010) also report lower yield (differential of 279 kg per hectare (ha)) but higher price 
(differential of USD 0.05 per ha) for organic soybean than conventional soybean for a 
Chinese farmers sample. Unfortunately, official statistics on the price of organic products do 
not exist in France.  
OT CT  fr>
                                                
om 3 onwt tp p t + ards
In our modeling framework, input prices are assumed to be the same ( ) .2 The 
impact of converting to OT on input costs is ambiguous ex ante since we expect, on the one 
hand, a decrease in the use of fertilizers and plant protection under OT, but, on the other hand, 
an increase in the use of labor and machinery costs. Sainte-Beuve (2010) reports such 
discrepancies for French farms in 2007.  
 
1 In France farmers are allowed to sell their products under the certified organic labeling after two years of 
conversion for field crops and three years for permanent crops. For simplicity, we used a transition duration of 
three years in our model. 
2 This may be a strong assumption since seeds and authorized fertilizers in OF may be more expensive than those 
used in conventional farming. Unfortunately, we do not have any statistical evidence to support this claim.  
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 Finally, under the assumptions of unchanged crop pattern on the farm and similar agricultural 
policy over the period considered, subsidies received by the farm are higher under OT due to 
the specific subsidies received by the farmer during the period of conversion ( ) 3OT CTt ts s> . 
On an economic point of view, subsidies are justified by organic farmers’ private 
internalization of social costs caused to the society from environmental pressures. On a 
practical point of view, subsidies may be seen as compensatory payments for the loss in 
revenues due to technical difficulties implying lower yields during the conversion period, and 
to the impossibility for the farmer to sell at the organic price during the first years of the 
conversion period. In France the level of conversion subsidies set by the government is 
calculated on the basis of the potential profit loss depending on the type of crop, and is 
provided per hectare of specific crop converted. For example cereals would be eligible to 366 
euros per hectare in the first two years following conversion, 183 euro/ha in the following two 
years, and 122 euro/ha in the fifth year (Ministère de l’Agriculture 2001).  
 
The decision of each farmer to convert to OF will thus depend, among other things, on 
production technology, organic price premium, costs differentials, conversion subsidies and 
farmer’s characteristics including technical efficiency. Since all these factors may differ 
across crops and geographical areas, the decision to convert to OF remains an empirical 
question.  
 
3. Description of the data and variables used in the analysis 
3.1. Database 
We use farm-specific data extracted from the French Farm Accountancy Data Network 
(FADN) database between 1999 and 2007. The FADN database includes accounting data for 
a sample of professional farms above a specific size threshold, with a five-year rotating 
sampling system. Only crop farms are considered here, based on the FADN classification 
according to farm production specialization based on their products’ gross margin: at least 66 
percent of the gross margin must come from a specific crop or group of crops. This 
classification is the standard EU classification called Type of Farming (TF). The TF 
                                                 
3 During the period analysed in our paper, French farmers could receive subsidies in the frame of the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy agri-environmental measures during the conversion period to OF. However, unlike 
all other EU Member States, France did not yet provide subsidies to remain in OF (Stolze and Lampkin 2009). 
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considered here include farms specialized in cereal, oil- and protein-seeds (COP) (TF13), in 
other field crops (TF14), in fruits and vegetables (TF28), in horticulture (TF29), in high 
quality wine (TF37), in other grape production (TF38), in permanent crops (TF39) and in 
mixed crop farming (TF60). All values relating to production were deflated by the national 
price index of agricultural output with base 2000. Values relating to capital were deflated by 
the national price index of inputs contributing to investment in agriculture, and values relating 
to variable inputs were deflated by the national price index of inputs currently consumed in 
agriculture, both with base 2000. 
 
Within the FADN database, information on whether the farm has engaged in OF is available 
since 2002 only. The specific variable enables to identify farms that are fully operating under 
CT, and farms that are fully operating under OT. Farms that are partially operating under CT 
and OT are not considered here due to data imprecision. Therefore, we consider that a farm 
has converted to OF in period t if it was fully operating under CT at year t-1 and fully 
operating under OT at year t. Since information on OF practices is available since 2002 only, 
the first conversion period that is considered here is therefore 2003. The earlier years of data 
(1999-2002) are used to calculate TE scores of the farmers who are still present in the FADN 
sample during the 2003-2007 years. 
 
Table 1 presents the number and share of farms having converted to OF during the period 
going from 2003 until 2007. The number of farms adopting OT is in general low, and this is 
partly due to the fact that we cannot consider partial conversions in our database. Overall 66 
farms in our sample have converted to OF in the selected TFs, which represents 1.1% of the 
sampled farms. A higher rate of conversion is observed for TF38 (other grape production than 
high quality wine). Among the 66 farms, 14 have converted to OF in 2003, 7 in 2004, 17 in 
2005, 17 in 2006, and 11 in 2007. 
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Table 1: Number of farms having converted to OF in the sample per TF 
 
Total number of farms Number of farms having 
converted to OF 
% of farms having 
converted to OF within 
the specific TF 
TF13 (COP) 1,972 14 0.7% 
TF14 (other field crops) 940 7 0.7% 
TF28 (fruits and vegetables) 311 4 1.3% 
TF29 (horticulture) 235 4 1.7% 
TF37 (high quality wine) 1,127 16 1.4% 
TF38 (other grape production) 344 8 2.3% 
TF39 (permanent crops) 468 7 1.5% 
TF60 (mixed crop farming) 433 6 1.4% 
Total 5,830 66 1.1% 
 
 
3.2. Factors hypothesized to influence OF adoption 
Farmer’s characteristics 
It is commonly acknowledged that non-economic factors such as political and ideological 
perspectives, sensitivity to environmental problems, health and food quality considerations 
may induce a farmer to convert to OF. For example, in a survey of 550 organic farmers made 
in Sweden in 1990, 79% responded that the primary reason for converting was non-economic 
(i.e., enjoyment, environment, health, food quality, or previous experience) instead of being 
related to reduce grain surplus, market adjustment, better economy or support provided (Lohr 
and Salomonsson, 2000). Also Läpple (2010) finds that Irish drystock farmers who expressed 
a higher level of environmental concern were more likely to adopt OT in 2008. Similarly, 
Genius et al. (2006) indicate that in 1996-1997 Cretan farmers who expressed great concern 
about environmental problems were more likely to convert to OF. The same finding is 
reported by Burton et al. (2003) for horticultural farmers surveyed in 1996 in the United 
Kingdom. Our data do not contain any variable on farmer’s opinion about issues related to 
environment, health and food quality. We introduce in our model a variable measuring the 
share of agri-environmental subsidies in total operating subsidies received by the farmer, as a 
proxy for his/her environmental awareness and environmental practices. We hypothesize that 
a farmer getting more agri-environmental subsidies under conventional farming is more likely 
to convert to OF.  
 
We also control for the farmer’s level of education. In a review of factors influencing the 
adoption of conservation agriculture practices (including, but not restrained to, OT), Knowler 
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and Bradshaw (2007) find that “education, be it specific or general, commonly correlates 
positively with the adoption of conservation agriculture practices; however, some analyses 
have found education to be an insignificant factor or even to negatively correlate with 
adoption”. For example, Genius et al. (2006) find that the number of years of education 
increased the probability to convert to OT by Cretan farmers in 1996-1997. Gardebroek 
(2003) also indicates a positive effect of education on the conversion probability for Dutch 
dairy farms in 1994-1999. Similarly, Koesling et al. (2008), for a survey of Norwegian farms 
in 2003, find a positive effect of education on the probability that a surveyed conventional 
farmer has indicated to potentially convert to OF in the future. Since better educated persons 
are often more sensitive to environmental problems but also because of the assumed positive 
link between education and knowledge regarding new technologies, we hypothesize better 
educated farmers to be more likely to adopt OT.  
 
Farm’s structural characteristics  
We expect the size of the farm at the time it was operated under conventional practices to 
influence the decision to convert to OF. Pietola and Oude Lansink (2001), for a sample of 
Finnish farms, find that farmers with large land areas and, consequently, good opportunities 
for practicing extensive farming technologies, are more likely to switch to OF. This reason is 
also proposed by Gardebroek (2003) to explain the positive effect of farm UAA on the 
probability to convert for Dutch dairy farms during 1994-1999. By contrast, Läpple (2010) 
finds that farm UAA has a negative effect on farmers’ decision to adopt OT for a sample of 
drystock farms in Ireland in 2008. McBride and Greene (2009) also report that the likelihood 
of choosing OT decreases with farm acreage for US soybean producers in 2006. They explain 
that small farms suffer from size diseconomies and consider OF as an alternative to improve 
farm returns. The situation may be similar in France since the largest farms, which are 
commonly located in plains, are usually the most productive ones (in terms of yields). On the 
contrary, farms in less favored areas are usually smaller and less productive. Hence the yield 
differential between organic and conventional farming ( )ot cty y−  is expected to be lower for 
smaller farms, which should then have a higher probability to adopt OT. For the particular 
case of France, we thus hypothesize that larger farms (as measured by the farm UAA) are less 
likely to adopt OT. 
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Policies 
Even if the theory indicates that the higher the subsidies to OF, the greater the probability of 
adoption should be, there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of the effect. Pietola 
and Oude Lansink (2001) find that the probability of switching to OF increases at an 
increasing rate with increasing premium subsidies to the OF for Finnish farms during 1994-
1997. They estimate that a 1% increase in the premium subsidy rate for OF increases the 
probability of choosing OT by 0.2%. Interestingly, the elasticity of the probability of 
conversion to the non-organic specific subsidy rate for land is the same. This latter result may 
suggest that the subsidy to support conversion may be seen by some farmers as a way to 
increase their revenues, at least during the period of conversion. Hence policies promoting OF 
may suffer from selection problems because subsidies may attract into OF less productive 
conventional farmers who are more “pragmatic” than “committed”. Tzouvelekas et al. (2001), 
in a study of the olive-growing sector in Greece, make a similar analysis. They assess that a 
“loose” eligibility criterion for receiving the conversion subsidy has attracted “subsidy-
hunters” not truly interested in producing organically but rather in absorbing the “organic” 
financial aid. Kumbhakar et al. (2009), for a sample of Finnish dairy farms (followed during 
the period from 1995 to 2002), also find evidence that higher subsidies increase the 
probability of OT adoption. Lohr and Salomonsson (2000) report that 147 out of 234 Swedish 
organic producers who converted in 1990 following the introduction of the conversion 
subsidy scheme in the country in 1989, would not have converted in the absence of subsidies. 
Tzouramani et al. (2010), using a real option approach on a sample of dairy sheep farms in 
Greece, explain that organic farming is not a profitable option in the absence of organic 
subsidies even if farms can benefit from investment subsidies to adopt the new technology. In 
what follows, we will calculate the organic subsidy level that each farmer would get over the 
next five years if converting to OF in the next year. This calculation is based on the 
assumption that the whole area is converted to OF and that the crop pattern on the farm does 
not change after conversion.4 We then use in the model the average conversion subsidy per ha 
of UAA per year. We hypothesize that a higher potential conversion subsidy per ha will 
increase the probability to convert to OF. 
 
We will also introduce in the model the total amount of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
subsidies received by the farm (as a ratio of its total output), and expect a positive effect as 
                                                 
4 Crop-specific conversion subsidies were obtained from Ministère de l’Agriculture (2001). 
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public subsidies may reduce the farm’s financial pressure. This effect was hypothesized and 
given evidence by Genius et al. (2006), who find that subsidies received in the context of the 
CAP by Cretan farmers in 1996-1997 increase their probability to convert to OF. The effect of 
non-organic subsidies on the probability to adopt the OT may also reflect the attitude of the 
farmer towards subsidies. However, this effect may be ambiguous. On the one hand, 
“subsidy-hunters” may be interested in both non-organic and organic subsidies, implying a 
positive effect. On the other hand, farmers receiving a large amount of CAP subsidies may 
find it sufficient and may not be interested in getting additional subsidies. 
 
Potential change in input costs 
Farmers who make an intensive use of fertilizers and plant protection products under 
conventional practices may experience a larger reduction in input costs after adoption of OT, 
and may thus be more likely to adopt. However, a non-intensive use of fertilizers and plant 
protection products before adoption could also indicate farmers’ environmental awareness and 
thus a higher probability to adopt OT. Also, conventional farmers who use a relatively low 
level of fertilizers and plant protection products are more likely to use a technology which is 
in fact similar to the OT, and may thus be more likely to adopt OT. The effect of the intensity 
of fertilizers’ and plant protection products’ use before conversion is therefore ambiguous but 
we expect the latter effect to dominate, that is to say low input use under conventional 
farming should increase the probability to convert to OF. McBride and Greene (2009) 
calculate farming cost under OT and CT for a sample of soybean producers in the US in 2006. 
The authors find that costs per bushel are on average USD 1 to USD 6 higher under OT than 
under CT. In particular, while chemical costs are lower under OT, capital and labor costs are 
much higher. Oelofse et al. (2010) report that total variable costs were higher for a sample of 
Chinese organic soybean producers compared to their conventional counterparts. The 
differential was USD 116 per ha, which is mainly due to a differential of USD 177 per ha in 
hired labor cost in disfavor of organic producers. Not using data from a sample of farms but 
with a case-study of one farm in England, Cobb et al. (1999) find that switching to OF induces 
higher labor costs and higher fixed costs (on this particular farm the conversion to organic 
agriculture required different machinery). Comparing one organic dairy farm with a 
conventional one with equivalent structure in 2003-2007, Shadbolt et al. (2009) indicate that 
the organic holding incurred higher fixed cost but lower cost per cow (veterinary, feed). In the 
forthcoming empirical application, we will use the ratio of fertilizer expenditure over the 
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standard gross margin as a measure of intensity of fertilizer use, but we do not have a priori 
expectations on the sign of the effect. 
 
Potential change in revenues 
In France, a farmer converting to OF will usually experience a decrease in revenue, at least 
during the first years of conversion. We expect that farmers for whom the expected decrease 
in revenue after conversion from CT to OT is lower to be more likely to adopt OT. This is 
confirmed for example by the study by Gardebroek (2003) for Dutch dairy farms in 1994-
1999, who finds that past year profit has a negative effect on the choice of adopting OT. 
Farms with higher past profit may indeed incur higher decrease in revenue if they converted 
to OT. It may also be the case that a positive shock on profit may encourage to continue with 
the current technology whereas a negative shock may encourage switching. The revenue 
differential depends on both yield and price differentials between OT and CT. In regions 
where yield has been historically high we expect a lower probability of conversion.  
 
The price differential between OT and CT has also an impact on expected revenues, as 
motivated in the modeling section. Official statistics regarding the price of organic products 
do not exist in France. We therefore make use of the information available in our FADN 
sample to compute a price index for organic products and build a variable that measures the 
price premium that farmers could get if they were switching to OF. This calculation is made 
under the assumption that the cropping pattern remains unchanged on the converting farm and 
that the entire crop area is converted.5 We are not aware of any study using such a variable to 
explain adoption. Pietola and Oude Lansink (2001) find that a 1% output price decrease 
increases the probability of choosing OT by 0.4%, but output price in their model is the same 
for both organic and conventional products. In our analysis we expect farmers with a higher 
expected price premium to have a higher probability to adopt OT. 
 
Technical efficiency 
As mentioned earlier, there exists a number of studies comparing the TE of organic producers 
and conventional producers but few try to assess the influence of TE before adoption on the 
decision to convert to OF. Some studies suggest that organic farmers are more technically 
                                                 
5 The price index for organic products was calculated from the FADN data, using the quantities and values of 
main categories of products sold by farmers fully engaged in organic production. 
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efficient compared to conventional farmers: e.g. Tzouvelekas et al. (2001) applying stochastic 
frontier to data on olive-growers in Greece, and Oude Lansink et al. (2002) applying DEA on 
data from crop and livestock farms in Finland. Other studies suggest the opposite: e.g. Serra 
and Goodwin (2009), using the local maximum likelihood method introduced by Kumbhakar 
et al. (2007), find that (Spanish) organic farms have efficiency levels that are below 
conventional farms. These authors argue that disparities between their results and results from 
other studies could be due to the difference in methodology. Similarly, Sipiläinen and Oude 
Lansink (2005), in an unpublished paper, find that organic dairy farms are less technically 
efficient than conventional farms in Finland, using stochastic frontier distance functions. 
Strictly speaking, the difference between average technical efficiencies between organic and 
conventional farmers cannot be interpreted to suggest that one group is more efficient than the 
other one since production frontiers are different for organic and conventional holdings. 
Differences in efficiency simply indicate that farms belonging to the group with the higher 
average TE operate closer to their production frontier than farms from the other group do to 
theirs. In a recent article Mayen et al. (2010), using formal testing, reject the hypothesis that 
organic and conventional farms employ a single, homogeneous technology using data on US 
dairy farms. They also find that organic dairy technology is 13% less productive than that 
used by conventional farms and find little difference in TE across the two groups. 
 
To our knowledge, the only study which considers TE as a potential factor driving adoption of 
OT is Kumbhakar et al. (2009). They propose a joint estimation where TE drives both 
technology choice and output. Based on a sample of Finnish dairy farms (over the period 
1995-2002), their results suggest that inefficiency is not a driving force behind adoption of 
OT as the inefficiency score has a negative effect on the probability of adoption. The level of 
TE achieved under CT may have an ambiguous effect on the decision to adopt OT. On the 
one hand, farmers who are already technically efficient under CT, that is to say who have 
rationalized their use of inputs, may adopt more easily a technology that is complex and that 
uses low levels of inputs. On the other hand, conversion implies a decrease in yields, and this 
may reduce incentives to convert for technically efficient farmers who obtain high yields 
under CT. The ambiguity is reinforced by the allocation of conversion subsidies. Indeed, 
conversion subsidies may compensate for the loss in revenue during the conversion period, 
and thus may reduce the negative influence of TE on the decision to convert to OF; it may in 
turn motivate highly efficient farmers to convert. However, if there is no obligation or no 
financial incentives to remain under OT after the conversion period, as it was the case in 
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France during the period studied here, then this may attract low efficient farmers in the 
organic sector, who may revert to CT once the compulsory conversion period has ended.  
 
In the forthcoming empirical application, in order to test for the effect of TE under CT on the 
decision to convert to OF, we consider four-year average of TE calculated before adoption for 
future OF adopters. By contrast to Kumbhakar et al. (2009) who use data from the same 
period to estimate TE and the probability to convert, we use data from the period before 
conversion to OT. Moreover, we use an average over several years in order to smooth for 
climate shocks that may affect TE levels. 
 
Risk 
OF is generally perceived to be riskier than conventional farming, as organic farmers are 
restricted in the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers that could help them in reducing 
production risk (Gardebroek et al., 2010). Organic farmers are therefore more exposed to 
disease or parasite outbursts, and to harsh weather conditions. Also, as it is the case with any 
new technology, a farmer willing to adopt OT has to face uncertainty regarding expected 
revenues and costs since it may take some time for him/her to learn about this new 
technology. Sipiläinen and Oude Lansink (2005), using data on Finnish dairy farms, estimate 
the length of the conversion and learning process of OF to be on average 6-7 years. 
 
Gardebroek et al. (2010) estimate the Just-Pope stochastic production function using panel 
data of Dutch organic and conventional specialized arable farms covering the period 1990–
1999. They find evidence that manure and other fertilizers are risk-increasing inputs on 
organic farms but risk-decreasing inputs on conventional farms. Capital and land are found to 
reduce production risk while labor and other variable inputs are found to increase it in both 
farm types.  
 
Using data from a sample of Spanish farms specialized in the production of arable crops, 
Serra et al. (2008) find evidence that both conventional and organic farmers are risk averse. 
Both groups are found to exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) but organic 
farmers have preferences that are very close to constant absolute and relative risk aversion 
(CARA and CRRA). The authors explain that these differences may come from the fact that 
organic farmers in the sample considered are wealthier than conventional growers (and may 
thus be willing to take more risk). Gardebroek (2006), using a Bayesian random coefficient 
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model, finds that organic arable farmers were less risk averse than conventional arable 
farmers in the Netherlands during the period 1990-1999. Regarding the link between risk 
attitude and conversion to OF, Acs et al. (2009) simulate the adoption of OT by a typical farm 
in the Netherlands with mathematical programming model. The authors find that the degree of 
risk aversion influences the adoption decision. In particular, it is optimal for a risk-averse 
farmer to adopt OT only in the scenarios of pesticide tax or conversion subsidies. Kerselaers 
et al. (2007) explain that one reason to low OT adoption in Belgium is the perception that 
farmers have of the production risks in OF, which influences in turn their perception of higher 
economic potential under OF. This implies that risk-averse farmers would have a lower 
willingness to convert. Using a sample of Irish drystock farms surveyed in 2008, Läpple 
(2010) finds that risk aversion, proxied by component scores calculated from several 
attitudinal statements, decreases the probability to adopt OT. Similarly, Kallas et al. (2010) 
find that Spanish grape producers surveyed in 2008 who took risky management decisions, 
were more likely to convert to OF. 
 
The measurement of risk aversion goes beyond the scope of this article. However, we will 
consider explanatory variables that may be linked to unobserved risk aversion. We include a 
categorical variable to control for the legal status of the farm which distinguishes between 
farms managed through a sole proprietorship, farms under partnership management, and 
companies. In the latter, private assets are separated from professional assets and therefore we 
would expect farms run as companies to be less risk averse than individual farms. We will 
also control for the ratio of farm debt to assets and hypothesize that farms with a higher share 
of debt will be less likely to convert to OF due to their current financial vulnerability. 
 
Social learning / neighborhood effects 
As far as we know, the role of social learning and neighborhood effects on the adoption of OT 
has not been extensively studied yet. It is recognized that information provided about new 
technologies (by other farmers, media, meetings, farmers’ unions, extension officers, etc) 
usually positively correlates with adoption of these technologies (Knowler and Bradshaw 
2007). Moreover, observing successful organic farmers could give incentives to conventional 
farmers to convert (Lohr and Salomonsson 2000). Lohr and Salomonsson (2000) find for 
example that, for a sample of Swedish farmers in 1990, the number of organic farms in a 
farmer’s district increases his/her probability to convert. Thus we should expect CT farmers 
neighboring OT farmers to learn more quickly about the technology and to have a higher 
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probability to adopt OT. Unfortunately we do not have any information on the total number of 
farms engaged in OF in the neighborhood of the farms surveyed in our sample.  
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics of the data 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the FADN sample French farms during the years 
1999-2007. Overall, 7,946 farms were included in the FADN survey over this period. The 
largest farms in our sample are those specialized in COP (TF13) and other field crops (TF14), 
with an average UAA of 142 ha and 111 ha respectively. These farms receive the highest 
amount of operational subsidies, on average, and are the least labor-intensive farms.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the data used; farm averages for the whole period 1999-2007 
Type of farming Number 
of farms 
UAA 
(ha) 
Total output 
(euros) 
On-farm 
labor (AWU) 
Total operational 
subsidies (euros) 
TF13 (COP) 2,592 142 112,263 1.6 53,092 
TF14 (other field crops) 1,338 111 187,623 2.4 36,679 
TF28 (fruits and vegetables) 409 14 259,828 4.9 6,461 
TF29 (horticulture) 283 4 252,026 4.7 2,058 
TF37 (high quality wine) 1,482 23 226,841 3.4 3,478 
TF38 (other grape production) 536 41 128,880 2.6 7,943 
TF39 (permanent crops) 628 33 197,173 5.2 15,525 
TF60 (mixed crop farming) 678 82 152,881 2.6 28,759 
Note: 1 AWU (Annual Working Unit) corresponds to a full-time equivalent of 2,200 hours of labor per year. 
 
A summary description of all variables that will be used as explanatory factors in the OF 
adoption model is available in Appendix A1 and some descriptive statistics of these variables 
are presented in Appendix A2. The summary statistics indicate that farmers who convert to 
OT have (on average) lower TE scores (how TE scores are calculated is explained below), 
operate a smaller farm, are more educated, receive a higher share of agro-environmental 
subsidies, and are less indebted than farmers who continue to operate under CT.  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. A two-stage approach 
We proceed in two steps. In the first step, we calculate the TE scores of all farms present in 
the FADN sample between 1999 and 2007. We use three competing methods to obtain TE 
scores and take into account that farmers operate in different agro-climatic conditions. In the 
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second step, we estimate the probability of a farm converting to OF in a specific year as a 
function of a set of farm and farmer characteristics before conversion, including the farmer’s 
average TE score computed over the four years preceding the conversion. The second-stage 
estimation is made on a selected sample of farms: those farms that are present at least one 
year during the 2003-2007 period and for which the TE score could be calculated over the 
four years preceding conversion. Since our sample is a rotating sample, we are not able to 
control for entry and exit of farms over time. We believe that this shortcoming of the dataset 
will not induce selection bias in the second-stage estimation.  
 
We chose to calculate the average TE score over the four years preceding the conversion in 
order to get a “robust” measure of TE for each farmer. Indeed, farmers may exhibit lower TE 
scores when facing adverse weather conditions. A four-year average allows smoothing such 
effects and avoid peaks or drops in TE that would be only artifacts of specific years. Going 
further than four years would have entailed the loss of too many observations at the second-
stage of the analysis. Further details on the methodology are provided in the following. 
 
4.2. First stage: calculation of TE 
In the literature two main approaches compete to calculate TE: parametric methods, in 
particular stochastic frontier (SF), and non-parametric methods, in particular DEA and FDH. 
The SF approach relies on estimating a production function with a double error term, 
including a random error term and a term representing farmers’ technical inefficiency (see 
Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck 1977). This method enables to account for 
noise, but may give rise to misspecification errors. By contrast, DEA is a deterministic 
method but does not rely on specification assumptions (see Farrell 1957; Charnes et al. 1978). 
The idea behind DEA is to construct, with linear programming, a piece-wise frontier that 
envelops all observations of the sample used. The distance of an observation to the frontier 
represents its technical inefficiency, with observations on the frontier being fully technically 
efficient and with a TE score of 1. FDH relies on the same idea, except that the convexity 
assumption of the frontier is relaxed, and thus the frontier is step-wise and envelops the 
observations more closely than DEA does (see Tulkens 1993). 
 
Non-parametric methods are sensitive to outliers as they construct the frontier with 
observations at hand. For this reason, in addition to cleaning manually inconsistent data, 
outliers were removed before efficiency computations with DEA and FDH, based on Wilson’s 
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(1993) outlier detection method that relies on comparing geometric volumes spanned by 
subsets of data. Moreover, efficiency results from the DEA method may be affected by 
sampling variation. This problem, inherent to the method, implies that distance from the 
frontier (and thus inefficiency) may be underestimated if the most performing units of the 
population are not included in the sample at hand. To correct for this problem, bootstrapping 
followed by bias-correction or confidence interval construction is the only method available 
(Simar and Wilson 2000a). Here the smooth homogenous bootstrap proposed by Simar and 
Wilson (1998, 2000b) is used to provide bias-corrected technical efficiency scores for DEA. 
 
In order to draw robust conclusions, the three approaches, namely SF, DEA and FDH, are 
used here. In each case the model includes one single output, namely total output in value, and 
four inputs, namely UAA (ha), total labor used in Annual Working Units (AWU; 1 AWU 
corresponds to one full-time equivalent that is to say 2,200 hours of labor per year), 
intermediate consumption in value, and the value of assets. The Cobb-Douglas function is 
specified for the SF approach.6 An input-oriented model is assumed for DEA and FDH. The 
assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS) is made for the DEA model. 
 
Farmers’ TE may be affected by agro-climatic conditions, and the efficiency scores calculated 
may not reflect only farmers’ management practices but may also incorporate some 
inefficiency component due to unfavorable natural conditions if the latter are not controlled 
for in the efficiency model. In our case, this may in turn affect the influence of TE on the 
probability to convert. For this reason, TE frontiers are constructed separately for groups of 
farms, depending on their agro-climatic conditions. Farms are firstly classified into two or 
three groups within each TF with a hierarchical agglomerative clustering procedure based on 
annual municipality data relating to slope, altitude, average monthly minimal and maximal 
temperatures, average monthly water deficits and average monthly climatic indices 
(calculated with sunshine, frost durations and evapotranspiration).7 Then TE is calculated 
with separate frontiers for each cluster in each TF and in each year of the period. 
                                                
 
 
6 When using a Translog specification for the stochastic frontier, convergence could not be achieved in some 
cases.  
7 Details on the clustering procedure are available upon request. 
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4.2. Second stage: estimation of the determinants of the conversion to OF 
Following (1), we assume that farmer i decides to convert to OF in period t if the expected net 
benefit of this decision is positive, that is if  
( ) ( )5 5* OT CT
1 1
0
t t
it it it
t t
d E E
+ +
+ +
≡ Π − Π >∑ ∑ .  (2) 
The latent variable, , is not observed; only the decision to adopt OT or not is known to the 
econometrician. We assume that farm i’s expected net benefit from converting to OF can be 
modeled as follows: 
*
itd
d* 'it it itε= +X β , where the vector Xit includes characteristics of the 
farmer and its environment. The decision model at time t is thus written as 
* ' 0it it itd ε= + ≥X β . (3) 
And the probability that farmer i adopts OT in year t is estimated using the following Probit 
model: 
( )'it it itd F ν= X β +
 t
, (4) 
where dit equals 1 if the expected net benefit *it  is positive, and 0 otherwise. Function F is 
the cumulative distribution of he it
 d
ε  error term, assumed standard normal. Maximum-
likelihood provides consistent estimates of the parameter vector . β
 
Our purpose is to model the decision to convert to OF. In the data used farmers who do adopt 
OT take the decision to convert to OF only once. Therefore, in our adoption model, a farm 
that converts to OF is included in the sample only once, in the year that the conversion is 
made, and excluded from the sample in the subsequent years (Khanna and Damon 1999 
followed a similar approach). For consistency, and to avoid the presence of repeated 
observations over time, a random draw is designed such that non-adopters also appear only 
once in the final sample. Since it is likely that the decision to adopt OT is made (at least) a 
year before the actual conversion, and in order to eliminate simultaneity bias, all explanatory 
variables are measured in year t-1, except for the TE proxy that is measured as the average of 
TE scores calculated in years t-4, t-3, t-2 and t-1, with t being the year of conversion for 
farmers who convert and being the year of observation for farmers who remain in 
conventional farming.  
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Three regression models will be estimated, differing in the TE score used as an explanatory 
variable: one regression including the average (over the four years preceding conversion of 
the converting farm or preceding observation of the conventional farm) TE score calculated 
with DEA under VRS and corrected for sampling bias; one regression including the average 
TE score calculated with FDH; one regression including the average TE score estimated with 
SF.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Technical efficiency 
Table 3 presents technical efficiency averages per TF calculated with the three different 
methods, with ex ante clustering of farms depending on their agro-climatic conditions. We 
distinguish farmers who converted to OF between 2003 and 2007, and farmers who continued 
to use a CT during the years 2003-2007. For farmers who converted to OF, we report the four-
year average TE score before the conversion period. For farmers who remained in 
conventional farming, we report the four-year average TE score before the year of 
observation. For each of the three TE scores (DEA-based, FDH-based, SF-based), we 
performed mean comparison tests between the two groups of farmers within the same TF 
(under the assumption that the variances in the two sub-samples are unequal). We indicate in 
Table 3 when the null assumption that the two means are equal is rejected.  
 
The average TE scores by TF vary depending on the computation method. For all TFs, the 
average TE score obtained using FDH is higher than the TE score calculated from the SF, 
itself being higher than the TE score obtained with DEA under VRS assumption. 
 
Table 3: Technical efficiency resultsa: averages over the period 1999-2006 
Bias-corrected DEA-based FDH-based SF-based   
TE score TE score TE score 
  Farms 
remaining 
under CT 
Farms under 
future OT b
Farms 
remaining 
under CT 
Farms under 
future OT b 
Farms 
remaining 
under CT 
Farms under 
future OT b
TF13 (COP) 0.73 0.74 0.90 0.92 0.80 0.85 (***) 
TF14 (other field crops) 0.71 0.74 0.91 0.98 (***) 0.81 0.79 
TF28 (fruits and vegetables) 0.69 0.73 0.94 0.93 0.82 0.80 
TF29 (horticulture) 0.78 0.77 0.97 0.97 0.84 0.85 
TF37 (high quality wine) 0.56 0.50 (**) 0.78 0.70 (***) 0.72 0.72 
TF38 (other grape production) 0.63 0.60 0.82 0.77 0.69 0.63 (*) 
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TF39 (permanent crops) 0.65 0.63 0.89 0.91 0.72 0.75 
TF60 (mixed crop farming) 0.72 0.74 0.93 0.93 0.84 0.90 (**) 
         
Total number of farms 6,096 65 6,096 65 6,156 65 
a Larger scores indicate higher TE. 
b (*), (**), (***) respectively indicates that the null assumption that the two means are equal is rejected at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance. 
 
The mean comparison tests indicate that farmers growing field crops (TF13, 14, and 60) and 
who will convert to OT have higher average TE scores than farmers who will keep operating 
with CT (except for TF14 with SF). The difference in average TE scores is statistically 
significant for SF-based TE scores in TF13 and TF60, and for FDH-based TE scores in TF14. 
For farmers engaged in wine and grapes production (TF37 and TF38), the average TE scores 
for farmers who will convert to OT are lower than the average TE scores for farmers who will 
remain with CT. The difference between average TE scores is statistically significant for 
DEA-based and FDH-based TE scores in TF37 and for SF-based TE scores in TF38. Finally, 
for farmers growing fruits and vegetables (TF28) or engaged in horticulture (TF29), there is 
no clear pattern and no statistically significant difference between TE scores of the two 
groups of farmers. 
 
5.2. Determinants of the conversion to OF 
We present below the estimation results of the three Probit regression models, which differ 
only by the method of calculation of the TE scores (DEA-based, FDH-based, and SF-based) 
used as an explanatory variable. The three models are estimated on a sample of 3,761 farmers, 
including 43 OT adopters. The number of farms adopting OT is quite small in our sample (see 
Table 1), which makes it necessary to estimate a unique adoption model with all TFs merged. 
A number of models were estimated differing on the explanatory variables’ combination, and 
we kept the one which provided the best fit to our data. In this model, the TE score has been 
interacted with the size of the farm (UAA).8  
 
                                                 
8 In particular, farmer’s age and regional dummies were tested as well as terms interacting TE score with the 
potential conversion subsidy that the farmer could receive if converting next year (POTCONVSUBS) and with 
the potential difference in price between organic and convention products (POTDIFPRICE). 
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Table 4: Results of the estimation of the probability to convert to OF (3,761 farmers) 
Probability of 
conversion to OF in the 
next year 
Model with 
DEA-based 
TE score 
Model with 
FDH-based
TE score
Model with 
SF-based 
TE score  
 Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z
   
TE score 
(past four-year average) -1.490 0.027 -1.517 0.026 -1.491 0.062
UAA -0.010 0.041 -0.014 0.043 -0.021 0.039
EDUC = 1 (ref.) - - - - - -
EDUC = 2 0.113 0.458 0.108 0.476 0.098 0.520
EDUC = 3 0.455 0.008 0.453 0.008 0.417 0.014
STATUS = 1 (ref.) - - - - - -
STATUS = 2 -0.053 0.716 -0.021 0.885 -0.003 0.981
STATUS = 3 0.167 0.452 0.212 0.333 0.242 0.268
SH_ENVSUBS 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.011 0.000
DEBTTOASSET -0.010 0.817 -0.006 0.848 -0.008 0.818
FERT_SGM -1.030 0.313 -1.063 0.297 -1.010 0.322
SUBTOOUT 0.198 0.750 0.104 0.865 0.118 0.850
POTDIFPRICE 0.003 0.260 0.003 0.235 0.002 0.496
POTCONVSUBS 0.000 0.793 0.000 0.816 0.000 0.717
TE × UAA 0.014 0.053 0.015 0.054 0.024 0.042
Year 2003 (0/1) 0.144 0.531 0.172 0.451 0.156 0.495
Year 2004 (0/1) 0.368 0.080 0.389 0.061 0.401 0.053
Year 2005 (0/1) 0.272 0.204 0.296 0.161 0.289 0.173
Year 2006 (0/1) 0.103 0.642 0.137 0.528 0.132 0.545
Constant -1.439 0.022 -1.109 0.137 -1.206 0.125
       
N 3,761  3,761  3,761  
Pseudo R2 0.0865  0.0865  0.0856  
Log-pseudolikelihood -214.67697  -214.6904  -214.89524  
Note: in bold, significant effects. Definition of explanatory variables in Appendix A1. 
 
Results of the Probit estimations are presented in Table 4 (robust standard errors were 
calculated). The four-year average TE score is found to have a significant impact on the 
probability of conversion directly as well as indirectly through its cross effects with farm size 
(TE × UAA), whatever the method used to calculate the TE score. In all three models, the 
direct effect of the TE score on the probability of conversion is negative and statistically 
significant while the cross term with farm size has a negative effect. Hence, the effect of past 
performance on the probability of conversion to OF depends on farm size.  
 
In our sample, the elasticity of the probability of conversion with respect to the TE score is 
found to be negative for low values of farm size and positive for high values of farm size. The 
turning point is calculated at 109 ha in the model using DEA-based TE scores, 101 ha in the 
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model using FDH-based TE scores, and 61 ha in the model using SF-based TE scores. For the 
sample used for estimating the model, the average farm size is 87 ha, hence the elasticity of 
the probability of conversion to the four-year average TE score is negative for some farms and 
positive for others. 
 
Because our sample gathers farms engaged in different production specializations (TF), it is 
important to check whether our main result, that the elasticity of the probability of conversion 
depends on farm size, holds for the entire group of farmers as a whole or if it could be driven 
by heterogeneous effects across different TFs. The number of adopters in each TF is too small 
to permit separate Probit estimations by TF. However, it is possible to interact TF dummies 
with the four-year average TE score and/or to add TF dummies in the model. We re-estimated 
the three Probit models under these different specifications. In any case do the TF dummies 
come out significantly. This indicates that our findings hold for all farmers in our sample 
whatever their TF. The main conclusion would thus be that “low-efficient” farmers operating 
a farm which size is below a certain threshold (61 ha to 109 ha depending on the model) are 
more likely to convert to OF while “high-efficient” farmers operating a farm which size is 
above this threshold are more likely to convert to OF.  
 
In our sample though, the average size of farms growing field crops is higher than the 
threshold (in TF13 and TF14 the average farm size is 142 ha and 115 ha respectively, and the 
average farm size is 82 ha in TF60) while the average farm size for farms growing grapes, 
fruits, vegetables or flowers is lower than the threshold. Our findings thus may indicate that a 
higher past performance induces a higher probability of conversion to OF in field crops but a 
lower probability of conversion to OF in other TFs. 
 
In order to assess the magnitude of the effect of TE on the probability of conversion to OF, we 
calculate, for each type of farming activity, the expected probability of conversion if all 
farmers were technically efficient (Table 5). In the second and third columns of Table 5, we 
report the current (observed) probability of conversion and the current number of organic 
farmers. We then show, for each of the three models (models with DEA-based, FDH-based, 
and SF-based TE scores) the predicted probability of conversion and the corresponding 
predicted number of organic farmers. These predicted probabilities have been calculated at the 
sample mean for each type of farming activity, and under the assumption that the average TE 
score is 1 (fully technically efficient farmers). 
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Table 5: Predicted probability of conversion and number of organic farmers if all farmers 
were technically efficient 
   
Model with 
DEA-based TE 
scores 
Model with 
FDH-based TE 
scores 
Model with 
SF-based TE scores 
Type of farming Current 
probability 
of 
conversion 
Current 
number of 
OF farmers
Predicted 
probability 
of 
conversion
Predicted 
number 
of 
organic 
farmers
Predicted 
probability 
of 
conversion
Predicted 
number 
of 
organic 
farmers 
Predicted 
probability 
of 
conversion
Predicted 
number of 
organic 
farmers 
         
TF13 (COP) 0.006 9 0.009 13 0.007 11 0.014 20 
TF14 (other field crops) 0.012 7 0.007 4 0.008 4 0.012 7 
TF28 (fruits and veg.) 0.011 2 0.004 1 0.010 2 0.007 1 
TF29 (horticulture) 0.020 1 0.004 0 0.011 1 0.008 0 
TF37 (high qual. wine) 0.015 12 0.002 2 0.005 4 0.005 4 
TF38 (other grape prod.) 0.021 5 0.003 1 0.006 1 0.007 2 
TF39 (permanent crops) 0.018 5 0.001 0 0.004 1 0.002 1 
TF60 (mixed crop farm.) 0.010 2 0.006 1 0.008 2 0.011 2 
         
Total  43  22  26  38 
 
All three models predict an increase in the number of organic farmers producing COP (TF13). 
In the model using SF-based TE scores, the number of organic farmers more than doubles, 
while the magnitude of the effect is smaller in the other models. The number of organic 
farmers is found to decrease or remain constant in the other types of farming. This is because 
the elasticity of the probability of conversion is negative at the mean of the corresponding 
samples. All in all, if all farmers in our sample were technically efficient, the number of 
organic adopters would be lower. Depending on the model, it would vary from 22 to 38, 
which corresponds to a decrease in the number of adopters in the range of 12% to 50%.  
 
The three models also provide consistent findings on the positive role of education (EDUC): 
better educated farmers are found to be more likely to convert to OF than less educated 
farmers. More educated farmers may be more sensitive to environmental and food safety 
issues, they may also learn more quickly about new technologies, than less educated farmers. 
In the three models, smaller farms (when size is measured by UAA) are found to be more 
likely to adopt OT all other things equal, which may be explained by smaller farms generating 
lower yields under CT than larger farms (and thus expecting a lower yield loss if converting 
to OF). These two findings confirm our expectations. 
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In the three Probit regression models, we obtain the expected result that farmers receiving 
more agri-environmental subsidies (as a percentage of total subsidies) (SH_ENVSUBS) are 
more likely to convert to OF. Also, farmers who incur higher fertilizers expenditure 
(relatively to their standard gross margin) (FERT_SGM) are less likely to convert to OF (this 
variable is however not significant in any of the three models). The coefficients for the 
potential difference in prices (organic versus non-organic products) (POTDIFPRICE) and the 
potential conversion subsidies (POTCONVSUBS) that could be received annually if 
converting next year are positive as expected, but not significant. The variables representing 
risk, namely legal status (STATUS) and indebtedness (DEBTTOASSET) are not significant 
in any of the models, as well as the proxy for subsidy dependence (SUBTOOUT). 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
Because the proportion of adopters is very small in the full sample, we re-estimated the three 
Probit models on a choice-based sample (see Greene 2003), that is a sample in which the 
proportion of adopters is made artificially higher (the non-adopters are randomly selected). 
Our choice-based sample contains 238 observations, among them 43 adopters and 195 non-
adopters, hence the proportion of adopters has been increased to 18% compared to our 
original sample. In order to correct the bias induced by over-sampling one group of farms, we 
estimate the model using the weighted endogenous sampling maximum likelihood (WESML) 
estimator derived by Manski and Lerman (1977). The log-likelihood function is written as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ },ln ln 1 ln 1it it iti tL d F d Fρ ⎡ ⎤= + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ 'it itX β X β'   (5) 
where  describes the adoption decision (itd 0itd =  or 1itd = ), 
( ) ( )(1 1 0 01it it itd d )ρ κ ζ κ ζ= + − , with 1κ  and 0κ  the true population proportions 
(obtained from the representative sample of farms), and 1ζ  and 0ζ  the proportions of 
adopters and non-adopters in the choice-based sample.9 The estimation results are shown in 
Appendix A3.  
 
The results obtained for the choice-based sample are found to be very close to the ones 
obtained for the full sample. However some of the explanatory variables have become 
                                                 
9 The first and second derivatives of the log-likelihood function are weighted likewise and the asymptotic 
covariance matrix is corrected (Greene 2003). 
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significant in the models based on the choice-based sample, in particular the ratio of debt to 
asset (DEBTTOASSET) and the potential difference in prices between organic and 
conventional products that may be received by converting farmers (POTDIFPRICE). The 
ratio of debt to asset has the expected negative sign in the three models and is found 
significant in the models using the DEA- and FDH-based TE scores. This confirms that farms 
already indebted are less likely to take any risk in converting to OF. This result may also 
indicate that the farming assets are to some extent technology specific. Farmers who have 
recently invested (in technology specific assets) would incur higher switching costs and are, 
therefore, more reluctant to switch. A higher expected difference in prices between organic 
and conventional product is found to significantly increase the probability of adoption in the 
three models, which also confirms our intuition. 
 
The TE scores were calculated based on separate frontiers for each TF, each year, and each 
cluster (defined from agro-climatic conditions). These TE scores were then pooled together in 
the Probit model. One could argue that TE scores calculated under different frontiers are not 
directly comparable. However, estimating TE scores for all farmers considering a unique 
frontier would not be relevant either, since farmers in different TF are likely to operate under 
different technologies (in particular for farmers growing field crops and farmers growing 
fruits or vegetables). In order to test the robustness of our results, we use relative TE scores 
instead of absolute TE scores used for obtaining results of Table 4. The relative TE score for 
farmer i is defined as the percentage of farms that have a lower TE score than farmer’s i own 
TE score (in the group of farms that are used to define the frontier). We call these variables 
TE ranks. The three Probit models are then re-estimated on the full sample using TE ranks 
instead of TE scores. Estimation results are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Results of the estimation of the probability to convert to OF using TE-ranks (3,761 
farmers) 
Probability of 
conversion to OF in 
the next year 
Model with 
DEA-based 
TE rank 
Model with 
FDH-based
TE rank
Model with 
SF-based 
TE rank  
 Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z
   
TE rank based on past  
four-year average score -0.009 0.013 -0.007 0.062 -0.007 0.029
UAA -0.007 0.018 -0.003 0.104 -0.005 0.031
EDUC = 1 (ref.) - - - - - -
EDUC = 2 0.111 0.467 0.111 0.463 0.121 0.430
EDUC = 3 0.431 0.012 0.455 0.008 0.467 0.006
STATUS = 1 (ref.) - - - - - -
STATUS = 2 -0.002 0.989 -0.050 0.732 -0.016 0.910
STATUS = 3 0.247 0.261 0.157 0.480 0.207 0.342
SH_ENVSUBS 0.011 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000
DEBTTOASSET -0.009 0.807 -0.010 0.809 -0.006 0.852
FERT_SGM -0.926 0.362 -1.059 0.295 -1.087 0.286
SUBTOOUT 0.035 0.956 0.163 0.791 0.114 0.853
POTDIFPRICE 0.002 0.590 0.002 0.386 0.003 0.315
POTCONVSUBS 0.000 0.773 0.000 0.903 0.000 0.962
TE × UAA 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.035
Year 2003 (0/1) 0.161 0.485 0.178 0.437 0.160 0.487
Year 2004 (0/1) 0.388 0.064 0.425 0.041 0.383 0.067
Year 2005 (0/1) 0.302 0.157 0.338 0.111 0.302 0.153
Year 2006 (0/1) 0.153 0.484 0.174 0.423 0.143 0.510
Constant -1.955 0.000 -2.202 0.000 -2.058 0.000
       
N 3,761  3,761  3,761  
Pseudo R2 0.0916  0.0826  0.0867  
Log-pseudolikelihood -213.4851  -215.61392  -214.64052  
Note: in bold, significant effects. Definition of explanatory variables in Appendix A1. 
 
Table 6 indicates that the three models provide results that are similar to the ones obtained 
using TE scores and presented in Table 4. The elasticity of the probability of conversion with 
respect to the TE score is still a function of farm size, with a negative value for small sizes 
and a positive value for large sizes. The turning point in the three models is as follows: 148 ha 
in the model using DEA-based TE ranks, 110 ha in the model using FDH-based TE ranks, and 
93 ha in the model using SF-based TE ranks. Thus, the turning point is slightly higher when 
using TE ranks than when using TE scores, but not by a very large margin. 
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6. Conclusion 
Using a sample of French crop farms over the 1999-2007 period, we test whether technical 
efficiency attained under conventional practices is a driver for conversion to OF. Despite 
some limitations in our data, we find that the probability of conversion does depend on 
technical efficiency preceding conversion but that the direction of the effect depends on farm 
size. More efficient farmers have a lower probability to convert if they operate small farms 
while they have a higher probability to convert if they operate large farms. The threshold that 
defines the sign of the elasticity of the probability of conversion to the average TE score has 
been estimated between 61 ha and 109 ha depending on the model. In our sample, the average 
size of farms engaged in field crops is higher than the threshold, while the average size of 
farms engaged in grape, fruits, vegetables or flower production is lower than the threshold. 
This finding is found to be robust to the method of calculation and definition of TE scores, 
either parametric (SF) or non-parametric (bias-corrected DEA or FDH). This study also 
confirms that farmer’s and farm’s characteristics (education, farm size, indebtedness) and 
farmers’ practices under the CT (as measured by the share of agri-environmental subsidies in 
total subsidies and expenditure in fertilizers) do impact the probability of conversion to OF. 
The low number of OT adopters in our sample and the impossibility to analyze partial 
conversions were the main limitations of our analysis. With a higher number of observations, 
we could have tested for heterogeneous responses across different types of farming or 
geographical areas.  
 
Our results thus indicate that there may be an (adverse) selection effect, that is less efficient 
farmers being attracted by OF, in particular among the group of “small” farms in France. This 
is not a surprising finding given that small farms may suffer from financial problems due to 
their size (diseconomies of scale, difficulties to sell their small output to downward industries, 
credit constraints) which force them to consider production alternatives. One of them is OF, 
which enables small farms to produce high-value commodities, to obtain higher prices, to sell 
in short circuits, and thus to increase their profit. Hence, small inefficient farms are more 
likely to consider conversion to OF. However, with our results we cannot ascertain that such 
farms adopt OT in the main objective of receiving additional subsidies, nor that the selection 
effect is prompted by the subsidy program. Our findings would have to be confirmed with 
more recent data for two reasons. Firstly, the support scheme to OF has changed in 2008 with 
the introduction of payments to remain in OF, once the conversion period has ended. Thus, 
farmers adopting OT may now receive compensatory payments during and after the 
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conversion. This may lower the rate of OF abandonment but may trigger the conversion of 
inefficient farmers who, under the conversion-subsidy only scheme, did not want to engage in 
the heavy conversion process fearing that they may not be able to remain in OF afterwards in 
the absence of subsidies at the end of the conversion. Secondly, the requirements under OF 
have changed in 2009 in France. The European Commission issued the first regulation 
governing OF standards EU-wide which applied in all member states from 1 January 2009 
onwards. While on a competition point of view such regulation was welcome by French 
farmers who felt that they could not compete with imports of organic products from countries 
with less strict production rules, on a technical point of view the regulation largely lowers the 
national requirements that were in place in France. Hence, French farmers willing to convert 
to OF may find it easier now that the requirements are less tight, which may induce the 
conversion of less efficient farmers. Investigating the role of TE and organic payments on 
farmers’ decision to convert is therefore necessary on more recent data. 
 
On a policy point of view, such issue is crucial. Indeed, public authorities in industrialized 
countries have always been interested in the drivers of structural change and in whether the 
agricultural sector’s competitiveness is constrained by the survival of inefficient farms. In 
general it is recognized that public support programs to agriculture enable inefficient farms to 
remain in the sector by covering their losses. However, inefficient farms may provide services 
to the society other than the production of food and fiber. The protection of environment is 
one of such services, whose provision is supposed to be realized by organic farms. In 
addition, higher labor employment on organic farms than on conventional farms may 
contribute to the socio-economic health of rural areas, in particular the remote ones.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A1: Description of the explanatory variables used in the OF adoption model. 
 
Variable name Measurement 
unit 
Description Source 
UAA  ha Farm’s UAA FADN 1999 to 2007 
EDUC Categorical  
variable 
Farmer’s education level  
1. No or primary education 
2. Low secondary education 
3. High secondary education 
FADN 1999 to 2007 
STATUS Categorical  
variable 
Farm’s legal status 
1. Sole proprietorship 
2. Partnership 
3. Companies 
FADN 1999 to 2007 
SH_ENVSUBS % Farm’s share of agri-
environmental subsidies in 
total operating subsidies 
FADN 1999 to 2007 
DEBTTOASSET ratio Farm’s debt to asset ratio FADN 1999 to 2007 
FERT_SGM ratio Farm’s fertilizers 
expenditure to standard 
gross margin 
FADN 1999 to 2007 
SUBTOOUT ratio Farm’s total operating 
subsidies to total output 
FADN 1999 to 2007 
POTDIFPRICE euro Potential difference in prices 
between organic and 
conventional products, for 
the farm if converting 
Authors’ own 
calculation based on 
FADN 1999-2007  
POTCONVSUBS euro/ha Potential yearly conversion 
subsidies, for the farm if 
converting next year 
Authors’ own 
calculation based on 
FADN 1999-2007 
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Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in the Probit models 
(averages for the 2003-2007 period). 
 
Farmers with future OT Farmers remaining with CT   
  
Number of farmers 43 3,718 
   
DEA-based TE score 0.60 0.65 
FDH-based TE score 0.83 0.86 
SF-based TE score 0.75 0.78 
UAA 62.27 87.62 
EDUC = 1  0.23 0.36 
EDUC = 2 0.42 0.48 
EDUC = 3 0.35 0.15 
STATUS = 1  0.51 0.56 
STATUS = 2 0.37 0.37 
STATUS = 3 0.12 0.06 
SH_ENVSUBS 13.91 3.02 
DEBTTOASSET 0.99 5.31 
FERT_SGM 0.09 0.12 
SUBTOOUT 0.14 0.18 
POTDIFPRICE -14.38 -9.97 
POTCONVSUBS 381.10 345.53 
Note: Definition of explanatory variables in Appendix A1. 
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Appendix A3: Results of the estimation of the probability to convert to OF (choice-based 
sample) 
 
Probability of 
conversion to OF in the 
next year 
Model with 
DEA-based 
TE score 
Model with 
FDH-based
TE score
Model with 
SF-based 
TE score 
 Coef. P>z Coef. P>z Coef. P>z
       
TE score 
(past four-year average) -1.231 0.114 -1.278 0.092 -2.187 0.046
UAA -0.008 0.181 -0.014 0.216 -0.022 0.081
EDUC = 1 (ref.) - - - - - -
EDUC = 2 -0.014 0.939 -0.021 0.908 -0.049 0.785
EDUC = 3 0.562 0.014 0.565 0.014 0.500 0.025
STATUS = 1 (ref.) - - - - - -
STATUS = 2 -0.197 0.286 -0.165 0.365 -0.159 0.389
STATUS = 3 0.038 0.886 0.075 0.774 0.067 0.805
SH_ENVSUBS 0.013 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.009
DEBTTOASSET -0.136 0.090 -0.137 0.085 -0.120 0.129
FERT_SGM -1.587 0.170 -1.598 0.164 -1.148 0.331
SUBTOOUT -0.359 0.591 -0.415 0.545 -0.723 0.350
POTDIFPRICE 0.007 0.057 0.007 0.056 0.006 0.073
POTCONVSUBS 0.000 0.948 0.000 0.832 0.000 0.960
TE × UAA 0.012 0.174 0.016 0.197 0.026 0.079
Year 2003 (0/1) 0.173 0.500 0.209 0.411 0.218 0.381
Year 2004 (0/1) 0.440 0.040 0.464 0.029 0.497 0.024
Year 2005 (0/1) 0.384 0.142 0.414 0.103 0.442 0.069
Year 2006 (0/1) -0.009 0.970 0.010 0.967 -0.010 0.968
Constant -1.386 0.048 -1.154 0.157 -0.497 0.610
       
N 238  238  238  
Pseudo R2 0.1057  0.1079  0.1107  
Log-pseudolikelihood -13.299526  -13.267239  -13.225933  
Note: in bold, significant effects. Definition of explanatory variables in Appendix A1. 
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